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Abstract 
The quality and availability of labour is important for the economic performance of clusters 
and consequently regions. The availability of labour in clusters is superior compared to 
locations outside clusters, because labour in clusters is relatively mobile, education services 
in clusters are relatively good and employees have a high willingness to invest in specific 
skills. Apart from these effects that arise ‘spontaneously’, firms and governments also 
actively aim to improve the quality of the labour pool in the cluster. Since clusters differ in 
the extent to which relevant stakeholders manage to improve the labour pool, these efforts 
have an effect on the performance of clusters.  
This paper presents an analysis of these efforts of firms and governments to improve the 
quality of the labour force in three seaport clusters. In this paper the concept of a ‘training 
and education regime’ is presented as an approach to analyse efforts of firms and 
governments to improve the labour pool. This approach uses insights from various 
institutional economic theories. Important results of three case studies include first, the 
observation that the quality of training and education regime differs substantially per cluster. 
Second, the presence of a ‘regime manager in Rotterdam adds to the quality of Rotterdam’s 
training and education regime. Such an organisation may be effective across countries and 
clusters. Finally, the presence of leader firms, willing to invest in training and education also 
improves an education regime. 
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1 Introduction 
The quality and availability of labour is essential for the economic performance of clusters. 
Marshall (1920) already pointed out the role of labour in clusters, and Krugman (1991) 
identifies the presence of a labour pool as one of the three ‘agglomeration forces’, forces that 
lead to spatial clustering of related economic activities. Once clusters have developed 
beyond a certain size (in terms of jobs or number of firms) the quality and availability of 
specialised labour in clusters is better than outside clusters, for a number of reasons. First, 
employees with specific skills required in the cluster will move to the cluster, to enhance 
their employment opportunities and career development. Second, for employees in the 
cluster, it is more attractive to further invest in specialised skills, because these skills are 
useful for a variety of firms in the cluster. Specialised skills do not limit employability. 
Third, due to the substantial demand for specialised training and education, the quality of 
training and education services in the cluster is relatively high. This attracts new employees 
to the cluster and enhances the investments of employees in training. Furthermore, it 
increases enrolment of students in studies related to the cluster (Wolfe and Gertler, 2004). 
These effects that lead to a high quality and availability of labour in a cluster arise 
‘spontaneous’ as a result of decisions of individuals investing in their careers (Krugman, 
1991).    
Apart from these effects that arise ‘spontaneously’, firms and governments also actively aim 
to improve the quality of the labour pool in the cluster. Such investments do not arise 
spontaneously and depend on various institutional factors (see Amin, 1999). Clusters will 
differ in the extent to which relevant stakeholders invest in improving the labour pool. Such 
differences can be substantial and persist over long periods of time (see Storper, 1995 and  
Rodrik et al. 2004 for the influence of institutional differences on economic development in 
general). These efforts have an effect on the performance of clusters. Thus, effective cluster 
governance is a potential source of competitive advantage of a cluster. Whereas the 
influence of universities and knowledge centers on ‘learning and innovation systems’ has 
been relatively widely discussed (See Boucher et al., 2003 and Keane and Allison, 2003), the 
efforts to improve the labour force as a whole has received very limited attention, while such 
initiatives may be very relevant for a large number of relatively small or ‘non-hightech’ 
clusters (see Wolfe and Gertler, 2004). 
This paper presents an analysis of the efforts of firms and governments to improve the 
quality of the labour force in three seaport clusters. Seaports are relevant cases for   3
understanding labour in clusters, they are clearly clusters (De Langen, 2004) and are 
generally characterised by relatively much cooperation between public and private actors. 
Finally, port clusters are of interest because of the special role of ‘port authorities’, public 
organisations that play a large role in ports (De Langen, 2004). These port authorities act to 
some extent as ‘cluster managers’. Such a role may be relevant in other clusters as well. The 
cases may provide new empirical insights that are relevant in the largely theoretical debate 
on the relation between institutions and regional development. 
In the following section, the approach to analyse efforts of firms and governments to 
improve the labour pool is discussed. Next, the results of three case studies of ports are 
discussed. A concluding section finalises this paper. 
 
2  Improving the quality of the labour pool 
Firms and other organisations in a cluster can purposefully create ‘positive cluster 
externalities’, for instance by jointly investing in the quality of education. Such investments 
create ‘externalities’ because the benefits of a better labour force spill over to all firms in a 
cluster, through mobility of labour in the cluster, a large inflow of new potential employees 
and less scarcity of skilled labour with a downward effect on wages. Private investments in 
the quality of the labour force, especially through improving the training and education 
infrastructure are problematic because the benefits of such investments cannot be 
‘internalised’ by individual firms, but spread to all firms in the cluster, regardless of their 
contribution to the investments. Unless one ‘leader firm’ has a dominant position in the 
cluster, joint investments are required. However, even when (collective) benefits of co-
operation exceed (collective) costs, co-operation does not (always) develop spontaneously, 
because the collective action problem (Olson, 1971) is relevant in clusters (De Langen 
2004). Individual firms can ‘free-ride’ at the expense of other firms in the cluster, and this 
threat may prevent collective action in the first place.  
Cooperative efforts are relevant for various types of investments. Frequently mentioned 
examples include ‘training and education’, innovation and marketing (see De Langen and 
Visser, 2004, Fuller et al, 2004 and Ryan and Phillips, 2004). The presence of ‘collective 
action problems’ explains the emphasis placed on trust and ‘community involvement’ in 
clusters (see Maskell and Lorenzen, 2004), because both can help to overcome these 
collective action problems.   4
We propose the concept of ‘collective action regimes’ (CAR’s) to analyse the quality of 
cluster governance. For instance, the ‘training and education regime’ consists of all 
collaborative efforts of actors in the cluster to in the field of training and education. In 
different clusters, different regimes are relevant. Central in creating effective regimes is the 
ability to commit resources, such as capital and managerial involvement and commitment, to 
investments with shared benefits for firms in the cluster. 
This general definition of ‘collective action regimes’ (CAR’s) can be applied to specific 
regimes, such as the training and education regime (TER). Thus, the training and education 
regime can be defined as ‘the set of collaborative initiatives, taken by the relevant actors in 
the port cluster with the aim to improve the quality of the labour pool’.  
An analysis of the training and education regime requires attention for the roles of different 
modes of coordination in this regime. Six general modes of coordination can be 
distinguished (see Hollingsworth and Boyer
1, 1997, Williamson, 1985 and De Langen, 2004 
for a more substantial discussion of the role of these modes of coordination). 
1.  Markets; 
2.  Corporate hierarchies (firms); 
3.  Interfirm alliances (joint ventures); 
4.  Associations; 
5.  Public-private partnerships; 
6.  Public coordination. 
Markets are used when coordination beyond price is not required while hierarchies are used 
when activities can best be integrated in a single firm. Corporate hierarchies often result 
from vertical integration, for instance to reduce uncertainty. Public coordination is used to 
provide services with a ‘public good character’. Apart from these three ‘ideal type’ forms of 
coordination, three coordination mechanisms that are a mixture of the above mentioned three 
forms, are frequently distinguished: interfirm alliances, associations and public private 
                                                        
1   Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) also identify six modes of coordination, five of which we use as well. We add public-
private partnerships and do not include ‘communities’, because communities are in our opinion no modes of 
interaction.    5
partnerships. Interfirm alliances
2 are used to facilitate cooperation between a relatively small 
number of firms. Alliances between firms are more responsive to dynamic environments 
than corporate hierarchies (Best, 1990). Associations are collective organisations of firms in 
similar or related markets that provide collective goods (Hollingworth et al, 1994) for the 
members of the association. Associations are set up to enable cooperation between a large 
group of firms with shared interests. Public-private organisations are used to enable 
cooperation between public and private actors. Each of these modes of coordination has 
advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, different modes play complementary roles in a 
(training and education) regime.  
The mix and roles of different coordination mechanisms in a regime is relatively stable and 
path dependent
3 (see Westlund, 1999). Firms do not necessarily have sufficient incentives to 
change a regime
4.  Therefore, relatively inefficient regimes can persist. Consequently, 
regimes differ substantially, between countries, industries and clusters (see Hollingsworth et 
al (1994), who even argue that differences in regimes are central in the competition between 
clusters).  
The quality of the training and education regime depends on the ability of actors in the port 
cluster to create coalitions willing to invest in the training and education infrastructure. A 
large variety of firms in the port cluster, such as cargo handling firms, port industries, 
warehouse operators and transport companies benefit from a better labour pool. However, 
since individual firms cannot fully appropriate the benefits of improving training and 
education, inter-organisational arrangements (coalitions) are necessary to attract resources to 
invest in the quality of the training and education (see Olson, 1971). Five variables influence 
the quality of the training and education regime (see De Langen 2004 for a more detailed 
discussion):  
                                                        
2   We do not use the general term networks but the more narrow concept of ‘interfirm alliances’ that only include 
relatively tightly coupled networks of firms. 
3   Campbell et al (1991) argue that ‘When actors have already established associations (…) and thus the capacity for 
selecting far sighted cooperative strategies, they can more easily devise new multilateral governance mechanisms 
than actors from a sector where short sighted bilateral mechanisms dominate the governance regime (Campbell et 
al 1991, p. 331). This shows the path-dependence of regimes.  
4   Instead of investing in the quality of regimes firms can also leave the cluster when regimes are not efficient or 
‘free-ride’ on the investments of others.   6
•  The presence of an infrastructure for collective action, consisting of associations and 
public-private organisations, since these organisations provide a fertile ground for 
collective action, but do not develop automatically. 
•  The role of public organisations, since public organisations can contribute to the 
formation of coalitions and can be an important partner in coalitions.  
•  The voice (see Hirschmann
5, 1970) of firms. Voice is important because associations, 
public and public-private organisations face only limited ‘selection pressure’. Thus, 
voice adds to the performance of such organisations. 
•  A ‘sense of community’ (Bennet, 1998), since a higher willingness to invest in the 
‘port community’ enables the formation of coalitions.  
•  The involvement of leader firms, since these firms have incentives and resources to 
invest in improving the training and education regime and can play a leading role in 
the development of coalitions. 
 
3  Training and education regimes in three port clusters 
In this section, the results of three case studies are discussed. The case studies, Rotterdam, 
Durban and the Lower Mississippi Port Cluster (LMPC) are based on desk research, an 
interview with port experts, and results from a survey filled out by the majority of these 
experts (see De Langen and Chouly, 2004, for some more information on these port clusters 
and the selection process of the experts). The interviews for the case of Rotterdam were 
conducted in spring 2002 (43 interviews), Durban in June 2002 (34 interviews) and the 
Lower Mississippi in September 2002 (31 interviews). In this paper, the results of the survey 
questions related to the training and education regime are discussed.  
Table 1 shows the importance of five relevant collective action regimes for the performance 
of the port cluster (see De Langen, 2004 for an elaboration). Table 1 shows all five regimes 
are important for the performance of the cluster and the training and education regime is 
                                                        
5   Hirschman discusses three possible reactions when confronted with an unsatisfactory situation (in his case working 
conditions): exit, voice and as a third possibility, ‘silence’. The first two are sources of pressure, the third is not. 
When applied to association members, exit means that firms do not use services of associations. Exit does not 
directly contribute to the quality of a regime.    7
regarded as especially important in Durban, while it is regarded as less important in the 
LMPC. 
 
Table 1: the importance of five collective action problems in seaports 
CAP LMPC  Rotterdam  Durban  Overall  importance 
Hinterland access  4.8  4.6  4.8  4.7* 
Training & Education  4.1  4.4  4.8  4.4 
Marketing & Promotion  4.6  4.3  4.0  4.3 
Innovation 4.5  4.1  4.4  4.3 
Internationalisation 4.4  N.R.  4.0  4.1** 
Scores on the scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
*  Significantly more important than other regimes 
**  Significantly less important than other regimes 
 
The experts were also asked to evaluate the quality of the training and education regime 
(TER), based on the five variables that influence this regime, discussed in the previous 
section. Table 2 shows the results of this evaluation, for all three cases. 
Table 2: evaluation of the quality of the training and education regime 
Variable Rotterdam  Durban  LMPC 
Leader firms  1.6*  -0.3  -1.9**
, **** 
Organizational infrastructure  2.0*
, *** -0.4  -1.3 
Public actors  0.8  0.2  -0.8 
Community argument  1.1  0.7  -1.0** 
Voice 1.0*  -0.6  -0.4*** 
Overall score  1.1*  -0.1  -1.1** 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*   Significantly higher score than in other two port clusters 
**  Significantly lower score than in two other port clusters 
***  Significantly higher score than average of all factors in same port cluster 
****  Significantly lower average judgment of all factors in same port cluster 
   8
Three conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these figures. First, the training and 
education regime is relatively well developed in Rotterdam. However, even this regime is 
not evaluated as very good, the score is no more than 1.1 on a scale ranging from -5 to +5.  
This indicates that, according to the experts, there are opportunities to improve the regime in 
all three cases. 
Second, the main strength of Rotterdam’s regime is the quality of the organizational 
infrastructure. This evaluation underlines the relevance of public private cooperation, and is 
further discussed when describing the TER in Rotterdam.  
Third, the main shortcoming of the LMPC’s regime is the lack of leader firms. These firms 
are crucial for an effective TER. The TER’s are further discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
3.1  The training and education regime in the LMPC 
Apart from operational ‘training-on the job’ there are no specific education programs in 
transport and logistics for middle managers or senior executives yet. The universities in the 
area (greater New Orleans) do not provide port related education programs at the 
bachelor/master level. The Port of New Orleans organizes a training program for foreign port 
managers from developing countries, but this program is not aimed at ‘local’ participants. 
Thus, it does not significantly improve the quality of the LMPC labour market.  
In the past, an initiative to develop an education program for firms in the cluster failed to 
materialize, because of a lack of private commitment. No single firm was identified 
frequently as a ‘leader firm’ in the TER. Not sufficient firms were willing to invest in the 
education of their workforce, by sponsoring a joint program. This fact explains the negative 
evaluation of the involvement of leader firms in the regime (see table 2). The pilots in the 
LMPC, for instance, regularly grant scholarships to education institutions outside the state, 
but have expressed the need for such education programs in the cluster. They recently agreed 
to create institution specific scholarships for a new education program under development at 
the University of New Orleans (UNO) (see below).   
Cooperation, either between firms, between governments, or public-private, has improved 
recently (De Langen and Visser, 2004). This improvement is also demonstrated by new 
efforts to improve the TEP. The University of New Orleans has developed four courses in 
the field of ports and logistics. One course description argues ‘despite the large number of   9
employment opportunities in the metropolitan area, very few educational offerings within 
Louisiana are related to these opportunities’ (University of New Orleans, 2004). 
Furthermore, one of the university colleges of the University of New Orleans (College of 
Urban and Public affairs, CUPA), intents to set-up a bachelor of science in Transportation 
Studies (College of Urban and Public affairs, 2004). Such a study program would be a major 
step forward for the TEP in the LMPC, since the annual demand for transport related 
personnel is substantial (Louisiana Department of Labor, 2004).  
The proposed new program received substantial industry support, for instance from the 
members of the Transportation Committee of the World Trade Center (61 senior managers 
from firms in LMPC’s port cluster), various pilots associations and individual firms, such as 
maritime law firms. This shows the market for such a program. However, firms have not 
agreed (so far) to dedicate resources to the program. The new program will probably start in 
2005, and will be, when successful, the largest achievement in LMPC’s TER in the past 
decades.   
 
3.2  The training and education regime in Durban 
The training and education regime in Durban is regarded as very important by the experts. 
The involvement of various organizations in the TER is given in table 3. 
Table 3: Investments in Durban’s training and education regime 
organizations Relevant  investments 
(leader) firms  Firms have an incentive to invest in the training of their employees. The firms 
mostly contract education suppliers individually. 
Interfirm 
alliances 
Interfirm alliances do not play an important role in the training and education 
regime. 
Associations  Associations play a limited role. They do not engage in ‘collective bargaining’ 
for their members, nor do they strive to improve the education infrastructure.   
Public-private 
partnerships 
No public private partnerships have developed yet, the Portnet Academy (see 
below) could become such a venture. 
Public 
organizations 
The Portnet Academy has the ambition to become the central provider of cluster 
related training and education. Currently, the Academy only trains the Portnet 
labour force. Training programs from basic vocational training to specific short 
courses in port management are offered. 
The university of Natal offers port related education programs, amongst others an 
MBA. The university has good links with firms in the port cluster.       
    10
The key issue in Durban’s TER is the quality of the ‘education infrastructure’. This 
education infrastructure is good for higher education: the University of Natal offers a port 
related master program. On the vocational level the training infrastructure is poor, as no 
institution offers good port related training programs.  
Specific to Durban are the South African regulations related to education. These regulations 
are roughly organized as follows: firms have to pay an education tax to a national education 
fund, but these tax contributions can be (partially) refunded if the firm can prove it has 
invested in training its employees. This regulation is a quite elegant method to provide firms 
with clear incentives to invest in training and education of their staff.  
The regulation has also led to a surge of new education providers that aim to earn a living by 
providing training and education services. Even though such firms may provide adequate 
services for some segments of the market, many professional training and education services 
require scale. Only large numbers of students allow for investing in (computer) facilities and 
advanced training techniques, such as simulators. Currently, the lack of one professional port 
related education provider is a weakness of Durban. 
Given the incentives for firms to invest in training, collective action to make sure that one or 
a few organizations can develop to large scale education providers would substantially 
improve the education infrastructure. This opportunity is widely acknowledged, but no 
organization, either a cluster association or a strong leader firm has managed to organize the 
firms in Durban’s port cluster. 
Perhaps the most obvious candidate to develop into Durban’s leading port related education 
provider is the Portnet Academy. This organization provides all kinds of training to 
employees from South African Port Operations (SAPO), the largest port operator in the 
country, that is currently publicly owned, but likely to be privatized in the coming years. 
Portnet Academy has established cooperation with foreign large scale education providers, 
especially Rotterdam’s Shipping and Transport College and has sufficient scale. However, 
currently, the vast majority of training programs are for SAPO staff, not for firms in 
Durban’s port cluster.     
 
3.3  The training and education regime in Rotterdam 
The main characteristics of the training and education regime are given in table 4.   11
Table 4: Investments in Rotterdam’s training and education regime 
Organization Relevant  initiatives/investments 
(leader) firms  Huntsman and Shell are leader firms for training in the chemical industry. 
They put efforts in a joint training facility.  
Interfirm 
alliances 
Interfirm alliances are of limited importance in this regime 
Associations  Associations, especially Deltalinqs, invest in the quality of the training and 
education infrastructure, for instance through sponsorship of the chair port 
economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Deltalinqs also plays a role in finding resources for the ‘education and 
information center’ and the ‘process college’ (see below for a description of 
both initiatives). 
Third, Deltalinqs is involved in setting up a ‘young roundtable’ for young 
‘high potentials’ in the port, in order to improve learning and networking and 
create an environment fertile for the ‘creative class’ to work in.  
Public-private 
partnerships 
Education and information center (EIC, http://www.eic-mainport.nl/) hosts 
visits from students of all ages and arranges company visits of schools to 
firms in the port. The center also provides educational material for primary 
schools. 
Process college (http://www.procescollege.nl/) a public private partnership to 
provide training for process operators in the chemical industry. The partners 
are four schools and the port related chemical industry. 
Knowledge infrastructure mainport Rotterdam (KMR, http://www.kmr.nl/), is 
a ‘network organization’ aiming to free up resources to invest in training and 
education infrastructure. All relevant stakeholders are represented in the 
organization. KMR aims to develop/support coalitions, not to provide 
training. The process college’ and EIC are supported by KMR. 
Academic Center TransPORT (ACTP) is a partnership between universities, 
regional governments and the business community to invest in knowledge 
transfer and high quality education.  
Public 
organizations 
The training and education infrastructure is relatively good and consists of at 
least five education providers, four of which cooperate under the name 
‘Rotterdam Transport Schools’.  
The port authority (Port of Rotterdam, PoR) finances university chairs in port 
economics (together with Deltalinqs) and in cargo handling technology. PoR 
also financially contributes to EIC and ACTP. 
 
Table 4 shows that the training and education regime in Rotterdam consists of a large 
number of initiatives. Various coalitions are formed to improve the quality of the training 
and education infrastructure, and to increase the attractiveness of working in the port cluster. 
The large number of initiatives can be explained by the scarcity of well-trained labor in some 
segments of the labor market, especially for vocational technical training. The coalitions are 
successful: the region has become the center of training for many port related functions.    12
Central in the TER is the organization Transport and Shipping College (STC). This 
organization provides all kinds of port related training, from the most basic vocational level 
to the master’s level. STC provides various training programs for industry professionals and 
also some in-house training for large terminal operating companies. STC is technologically 
advanced, as demonstrated for instance by their ‘simulators’ for nautical training, ship cranes 
and supply chains. STC has recently also moved in providing education for the petro-
chemical port industries.   
Leader firms also contribute to the TER: especially firms in the petrochemical industry have 
invested substantially in new education facilities. These private investments would not have 
been made in the absence of leader firms backing the initiative.  
The training and education regime in Rotterdam has not been successful with regard to the 
re-training of ‘redundant’ port workers. Due to containerization, labor requirements in the 
cargo handling industry have diminished rapidly. Labor mobility could effectively reduce 
this redundancy, but in the Dutch context, forced mobility (firing employees) is very 
expensive. A program to re-train employees for enrolment outside the cargo handling 
industry could be an instrument to solve labor redundancy. In Rotterdam, this has not been 
successful, with as a consequence persisting labour problems. Given the fact that labour 
costs are important in the cargo handling industry, this hampers Rotterdam’s performance 
(De Langen et al, 2003). Currently, the labour redundancy is virtually solved (De Langen et 
al, 2003), but labour relations are still rather conflictive. 
The organizational structure of this regime in Rotterdam is interesting: it is the only example 
where one organization, ‘Knowledge-infrastructure Mainport Rotterdam’ (KMR) is 
specifically set up to improve the quality of the regime. The - stylized - role of KMR is 
visualized in Figure 1.   13
Figure 1: The regime manager in Rotterdam’s TER. 
 
 
This ‘regime manager’ is a network organization, where all relevant organizations 
(municipality, port authority, cluster association, private firms, education providers) are 
represented. KMR is truly a ‘network organisation’ with a small staff (in this case two 
persons). It aims to accelerate investments in the education infrastructure, but has no interest 
in developing such services in-house. The organization is effective in acquiring 
(inter)national resources to invest in Rotterdam’s TER. The value added of KMR is reflected 
in the positive evaluation of the organizational infrastructure in Rotterdam (see table 2).  
 
4 Conclusions 
Huge differences in the training and education regime between the three cases can be 
observed. In the LMPC, coalitions are hardly created and even though the potential benefits 
of collective action are recognized, actors are reluctant to invest (time) in improving the 
regime. In Rotterdam, the formation of coalitions is almost a routine. Various initiatives have 
been set up and add to the quality of the regime. Local and national governments play an 
‘enabling role’ in this regime by providing funds. Leader firms contribute to the TER by 
providing industry support for investments in training and education.   
The ‘regime manager’ contributes to the quality of Roterdam’s TER. Opportunities to 











‘regime manager’  14
Table 5: Opportunities to improve the training and education regime 
Port cluster  Opportunities to improve the training and education regime 
LMPC  Initiative to attract external resources to improve the regime. 
Durban  Collective action to improve the training and education infrastructure. 
Rotterdam  Re-training to solve labour redundancy problems. 
 
For each of the three port clusters, these opportunities are important. Labour issues have 
recently received more attention in all three port clusters. This is likely to lead to ongoing 
initiatives to create an effective training and education regime.  
These cases provide some insights that are relevant in the theoretical debate on the relation 
between institutions, cluster governance and regional development.  
First, the TER is becoming more important. The relevance of training and educations is 
widely recognised.  In all three clusters new initiatives have been taken or are considered. 
This leads to more attention for arrangements that enable effective investments in the TER. 
Second, the cases suggest leader firms are indeed important for the TER. This is especially 
relevant given the ongoing internationalisation of firms. As a consequence, leader firm 
behaviour is less based on historic roots of a firm in a region, and more on the quality of 
institutions that enable and are responsive to leader firm behaviour. This seems an important 
implication for policy makers in clusters. 
Finally, the concept of a ‘regime manager’ may be a relevant concept for understanding 
governance in clusters and more specifically the quality of collective action regimes. This 
concept is an addition to the existing literature on governance and education in clusters 
(Keane and Allison, 2003). The case studies suggest such an arrangement is effective in one 
port cluster, it may be instrumental for improving the quality of the TER in other clusters 
and other ‘regimes’ as well.    15
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